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Abstract We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qual-
itative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an
open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequi-
librium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payo⁄ by switching to
the deviation strategy designated for her. An equilibrium existence theorem for com-
pact, quasiconcave games with two players is established. We propose a new form of
the better-reply security condition, called the strong single deviation property, that
covers games whose set of Nash equilibria is not necessarily closed.
We introduce domain L-majorized correspondences and use them to study equi-
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A number of generalizations and strengthenings of Reny￿ s equilibrium existence the-
orem for better-reply secure games have been proposed recently. Among them are
papers by Barelli and Soza (2009), Carmona (2011), de Castro (2011), McLennan,
Monteiro, and Tourky (2009), and Reny (2009).
In this paper, we look at the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and
qualitative games through the prism of a property called by Reny (2009) the single
deviation property. Both better-reply secure games and diagonally transfer contin-
uous games (Baye, Tian, Zhou, 1993) possess this property. According to it, if a
strategy pro￿le is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exist an open neighborhood
and a full pro￿le of deviation strategies ￿one for each player ￿such that, at any
point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payo⁄ by switching to her de-
viation strategy. Intuitively, if the single deviation property holds and the game has
no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, we can associate with each strategy pro￿le
a neighborhood and a collection of constant valued correspondences de￿ned on the
neighborhood. With the help of a partition of unity and an assumption imposed
on the convex hulls of deviation strategies, Barelli and Soza (2009, Theorem 2.2)
glue the locally de￿ned correspondences together into an upper hemicontinuous cor-
respondence, de￿ned on the Cartesian product of the players￿strategy sets, to which
Kakutani￿ s ￿xed point theorem can be applied.
As is shown by a three player example in Reny (2009, Section 3), replacing the
better-reply security condition with the single deviation property does not result in
a complete set of su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in compact, quasiconcave games. In that example, even though it is possible
to ￿nd, for every point, a neighborhood and a collection of constant valued corre-
spondences de￿ned on the neighborhood, one cannot glue them together into a well
behaved correspondence having the Cartesian product of the players￿strategy sets
as its domain. Nessah and Tian (2010) show that if, instead of the quasiconcavity
2condition, a property related to but stronger than the diagonal transfer quasicon-
cavity condition (Baye, Tian, and Zhou, 1993) is assumed, then the existence of an
equilibrium follows.
The weak single deviation property, introduced in this paper, is weaker than the
single deviation property in two respects: (1) deviation strategies need not be de￿ned
for all players, and (2) every neighborhood of a nonequilibrium point may contain
equilibrium points, as in a second-price sealed-bid auction with two bidders having
di⁄erent valuations.
Intuitively, if a single player can increase her payo⁄ using the same deviation
strategy at every point of an open neighborhood of a nonequilibrium point, then
having to de￿ne deviation strategies for the rest of the players makes the above-
mentioned assumption on the convex hulls of deviation strategies less tractable. On
the other hand, if deviation strategies are not necessarily de￿ned for all players,
then it is impossible to use a partition of unity as the glueing technique. Therefore,
there is a need for applying di⁄erent tools, such as majorized correspondences. A
strengthening of Barelli and Soza￿ s equilibrium existence theorem, Theorem 5, and
its applications are studied in the last section of the paper, Section 4.
Theorem 3 states that every compact, quasiconcave, two-person game with the
weak single deviation property has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the players￿
strategy sets lie on the real line. To show Theorem 3, we proceed by contradiction,
assuming that the game has no equilibrium. Then we construct an open cover of
the Cartesian product of the players￿strategy sets that satis￿es the conditions of
Theorem 2, a version of Theorem 5 for normal form games.
In Section 3, we introduce a strengthening of the weak single deviation property,
the strong single deviation property. This property is not a generalization of the
better-reply security condition, but another, slightly improved, form of it. Lemmas 1
and 2 show that the strong single deviation property is equivalent to the better-reply
security condition in compact games with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As
we demonstrate by example, the strong single deviation property makes it possible
to apply Reny￿ s equilibrium existence theorem to games with a noncompact set of
pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Remark 1, we describe a possible way of amending
3the notion of a better-reply secure game.
Majorized correspondences have served as a powerful tool for analyzing quali-
tative and generalized games since the groundbreaking works by Borglin and Kei-
ding (1976) and Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983). At the heart of the proof of the
above-mentioned Theorem 5 lies the notion of a domain L-majorized correspondence,
a generalization of Yannelis and Prabhakar￿ s notion of an L-majorized correspon-
dence. Implicitly, the idea of domain L-majorization has been present in the litera-
ture studying majorized correspondences and their applications for quite a while. So,
Yuan (1999) introduces into consideration a correspondence whose values majorize
the values of the correspondence under study and that has a multivalued selection
with open lower sections. This very idea stands behind LFC-majorized correspon-
dences (Ding and Xia 2004). Domain L-majorization, introduced in Section 4, goes
a little farther: we do not majorize the values of the correspondence under study,
only its domain.
Lemma 5 provides a set of su¢ cient conditions for a correspondence to be domain
L-majorized that are equivalent, in the context of qualitative games, to Barelli and
Soza￿ s equilibrium existence conditions (Corollary 3).
Intuitively, the main result of Section 4, Theorem 5, deals with qualitative games
having a generalized weak single deviation property. Some of its applications are
provided there. Corollary 4 is a version of the Fan-Browder collective ￿xed point
theorem, and Corollary 5 is an equilibrium existence theorem for qualitative games.
2 The Weak Single Deviation Property
Consider a game G between n players where each player i￿ s pure strategy set Xi
is a nonempty, compact subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological vector space, and each
payo⁄ function ui is a bounded function from X = ￿i2NXi to R (X being endowed
with the product topology). Under these conditions, G = (Xi;ui)i2N is called a
compact game. As before, denote the set of players by N = f1;:::;ng. A game
G = (Xi;ui)i2N is quasiconcave if each Xi is convex and ui(￿;x￿i) : Xi ! R is
4quasiconcave for all i 2 N and all x￿i 2 X￿i; where X￿i = ￿k2NnfigXk. Denote by
EG the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of G in X.
De￿nition 1 Player i can secure a payo⁄ of ￿ 2 R at x 2 X if there exists di 2 Xi
such that ui(di;x0
￿i) ￿ ￿ for all x0
￿i in some open neighborhood of x￿i:
The graph of G is de￿ned by GrG = f(x;u) 2 X ￿Rn j ui(x) = ui for all i 2 Ng.
For a subset B of a topological space X, we denote the interior of B in X by intXB,
the boundary of B by @B, and the closure of B by clB.
De￿nition 2 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2N is better-reply secure if whenever (x￿;u￿) 2
clGrG and x￿ 2 XnEG, some player i can secure a payo⁄ strictly above u￿
i at x￿.
Theorem 1 (Reny 1999) If G = (Xi;ui)i2N is compact, quasiconcave, and better-
reply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
One can verify that every better-reply secure game possesses the following prop-
erty (see Reny 2009; Nessah and Tian 2010; or Lemma 7 below).
De￿nition 3 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2N has the single deviation property if whenever
x 2 XnEG, there exist d 2 X and a neighborhood UX(x) of x in X such that, for all
x0 2 UX(x), there is a player i for whom ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0).
We amend the de￿nition of the single deviation property in two important re-
spects. First, the requirement that a deviation strategy, di, be de￿ned for each player
i can be prohibitive in applications (see the proof of Theorem 3). Second, we ought
not to require that there be a player able to increase her payo⁄for those x0 2 UX(x)
that are Nash equilibria of G.
De￿nition 4 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2N has the weak single deviation property if
whenever x 2 XnEG, there exist an open neighborhood UX(x) of x, a set of players
I(x) ￿ N, a collection of points fdi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g such that, for every
x0 2 UX(x)nEG, there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di(x);x0
￿i) > ui(x0).
5To simplify notation, we will write di instead of di(x) if it is clear for which
neighborhood UX(x) player i￿ s deviation strategy di is used.
Example 1 Consider a two-bidder second-price sealed-bid auction with complete






0; if xi < maxfx1;x2g;
1
2(vi ￿ xi); if x1 = x2,
vi ￿ x￿i; if xi > x￿i;
where xi is player i￿ s bid and vi is her valuation of the object. The game possesses the
weak single deviation property. To verify this, for every x 2 XnEG choose an open
neighborhood UX(x) that contains x, and put I(x) = f1;2g and (d1(x);d2(x)) =
(v1;v2). At the same time, the game does not have the single deviation property
since the set of its pure strategy Nash equilibria is not closed.
Theorem 2 is an equilibrium existence result for games with the weak single
deviation property. Its proof is postponed until Section 4, where a more general
result, Theorem 5, is shown for qualitative games. For a set A, let hAi denote the
family of its nonempty ￿nite subsets. In assumption (ii) of Theorem 2, we assume
that di(x) = f?g if i 2 NnI(x).
Theorem 2 Let G = (Xi;ui)i2N be a compact game. Suppose that
(i) G has the weak single deviation property, i.e. for each x 2 XnEG, there exist
an open neighborhood UX(x) of x, a set of players I(x) ￿ N, a collection of points
fdi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g such that, for every x0 2 UX(x)nEG, there exists i 2 I(x)
with ui(di(x);x0
￿i) > ui(x0);
(ii) for each A 2 hXnEGi and every z 2 \x2AUX(x), there exists i 2 [x2AI(x) such
that zi = 2 cof[x2Adi(x)g.
Then G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
It is not di¢ cult to see that assumption (ii) of Theorem 2 is naturally satis￿ed
in a number of games. Among those are both quasiconcave games, such as second-
price sealed-bid auctions, and non-quasiconcave games, such as the duopoly game
described in Example 1 of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993).
6A compact, quasiconcave game with the weak single deviation property need not
have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The next example is borrowed from Reny
(2009).
Example 2 Consider a three-player game G = (Xi;ui)3
i=1 with X1 = X2 = X3 =
[0;1]. The payo⁄ functions are de￿ned as follows. Let, for r 2 [0;1],
u0(r) =
(
0, if r > 0,
1, if r = 0,
; u1(r) =
(
0, if r < 1,
1, if r = 1.
Then, for x3 2 [0; 1
2],
x2 2 [0; 1
3] x2 2 (1
3; 2
3) x2 2 [2
3;1]
x1 2 [0; 1
2] (u0(x1);u1(x2);u0(x3)) (u1(x1);u1(x2);u0(x3)) (u1(x1);u1(x2);u1(x3))
x1 2 (1
2;1] (u0(x1);u1(x2);u0(x3)) (u1(x1);u1(x2);u1(x3)) (u1(x1);u1(x2);u1(x3))
and, for x3 2 (1
2;1],
x2 2 [0; 1
3] x2 2 (1
3; 2
3) x2 2 [2
3;1]
x1 2 [0; 1
2] (u0(x1);u0(x2);u0(x3)) (u0(x1);u0(x2);u0(x3)) (u1(x1);u0(x2);u1(x3))
x1 2 (1
2;1] (u0(x1);u0(x2);u0(x3)) (u0(x1);u0(x2);u1(x3)) (u1(x1);u0(x2);u1(x3))
where the ￿rst coordinate of each entry corresponds to player 1, the second coordinate
to player 2, and the third to player 3. It is not di¢ cult to see that the game
is compact, quasiconcave, and has the weak single deviation property. At the same
time, it has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore it is impossible to ￿nd,
for each x 2 XnEG, an open neighborhood UX(x), a set of players I(x) ￿ N, and a
collection of deviation strategies fdi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 2.
For compact, quasiconcave, two-player games with the weak single deviation prop-
erty, the conditions of Theorem 2 can be satis￿ed if the players￿strategy sets are
subsets of the real line.
7Theorem 3 If a two-player, compact, quasiconcave game G = (Xi;ui)2
i=1 has the
weak single deviation property and each Xi is a subset of the real line R, then G has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix A. Intuitively, its ￿rst step is clear.
It proceeds by contradiction. Assume that the game has no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium. Then, since the game has the weak single deviation property, we consider a
cover of X consisting of open neighborhoods UX(x), with the corresponding sets of
players I(x) and collections of points fdi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g. The compactness of
X implies that the cover has a ￿nite subcover, and it is tempting to conclude that
what is left is to apply Theorem 2. However, Example 3 demonstrates that it is not
so.
Example 3 Consider a two-player game G = (Xi;ui)2
i=1 with X1 = X2 = [0;1], and





1 if x 2 f1
2g ￿ [0; 1
2) and x 2 (0; 1
2] ￿ [1
2;1],
2 if x 2 f0g ￿ [1
2;1],
0 otherwise,





1 if x 2 (1
2;1] ￿ f1
2g and x 2 [0; 1
2] ￿ [1
2;1),
2 if x 2 [0; 1
2] ￿ f1g,
0 otherwise.







10). For this open neighborhood of x = (1
2; 1
2),
I(x) = f1;2g, and, unfortunately, there are two possible ways of choosing the set





2) = (0; 1
2). Since xi 2
cofd1
i;d2
ig for i = 1;2, it is quite possible that assumption (ii) of Theorem 2 does
not hold for a ￿nite subcover consisting of open balls, irrespective of how small its
8elements are. As a result, we have to amend the ￿nite cover to make Theorem 2
applicable (see Appendix A for details).
3 The Strong Single Deviation Property
In this section, we introduce a strengthening of the weak single deviation property
and show that it is another, slightly weakened, form of the better-reply security
condition.
De￿nition 5 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2N has the strong single deviation property if
whenever x 2 XnEG, there exist an open neighborhood UX(x) of x, a set of players
I(x) ￿ N, a family of open neighborhoods fUX￿i(x￿i) : i 2 I(x)g, a collection of
deviation strategies fdi(x) 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g, and a number "(x) > 0 such that, for
every x0 2 U(x)nEG, there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di(x);z￿i) ￿ "(x) > ui(x0) for all
z￿i 2 UX￿i(x￿i) such that (di(x);z￿i) 2 XnEG.
A game with the strong single deviation property need not be better-reply secure
in the sense of De￿nition 2.
Example 4 Consider a timing game between two players with X1 = X2 = [0;1].





1 if xi < x￿i;
’i(xi) if xi = x￿i;
￿1 if xi > x￿i;
where ’i(xi) = 1 if xi = x￿i and xi < 0:5, and ’i(xi) = 0 if xi = x￿i and xi ￿ 0:5.
The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game is EG = fx 2 [0; 1
2) ￿ [0; 1
2) :
x1 = x2g. It is easy to see that the game is not better-reply secure at (1
2; 1
2). Now
we show that it has the strong single deviation property.
We have to consider two possible cases.
Case 1. If x 2 X is such that x￿i < xi for some i 2 f1;2g, then put r =
xi￿x￿i
2 ,
I(x) = fig, di(x) = 0, UX(x) = BX(x;r), UX￿i(x￿i) = BX￿i(x￿i;r), and "(x) = 1.
9Case 2. If x 2 X is such that x1 = x2 and x1 ￿ 1
2, then put r =
x1
2 , I(x) = f1;2g,
(d1(x);d2(x)) = (0;0), UX(x) = BX(x;r), UX￿i(x￿i) = B￿i(x￿i;r), and "(x) = 1
2.
Verifying that the game possesses the strong single deviation property is a straight-
forward exercise in both cases.
The di⁄erence between the strong single deviation property and the better-reply
security condition is in the way Nash equilibria are treated.
Lemma 1 If a compact game G = (Xi;ui)i2N with no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies has the strong single deviation property, then it is better-reply secure.
Proof. Assume that x￿ 2 X and u￿ 2 Rn are such that (x￿;u￿) 2 clGrG. Since
the game has the strong single deviation property, there exist an open neighborhood
UX(x￿) of x￿, a set of players I(x￿) ￿ N, a family of open neighborhoods fUX￿i(x￿
￿i) :
i 2 I(x￿)g, a collection of deviation strategies fdi 2 Xi : i 2 I(x￿)g, and a number
"(x￿) > 0 such that, for every x0 2 UX(x￿), there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di;z￿i) ￿
"(x￿) > ui(x0) for all z￿i 2 UX￿i(x￿
￿i).
We shall show that some player i can secure a payo⁄ strictly above u￿
i at x￿.
Consider a net fx￿g converging to x￿ such that the corresponding net fu(x￿)g tends






￿ ￿ b ￿ and all i 2 I(x￿). In particular, by the strong single deviation property,
the inclusion x
b ￿ 2 UX(x￿) implies that there exists i 2 I(x￿) such that ui(di;z￿i) ￿
"(x￿) > ui(x
b ￿) for all z￿i 2 UX(x￿









The following corollary follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 If G = (Xi;ui)i2N is compact, quasiconcave, and has the strong single
deviation property, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1 It is not di¢ cult to relax the better-reply security condition to cover,
for example, the above timing game. Instead of considering the graph of G, we can
introduce the "nonequilibrium" graph of G by GrnG = f(x;u) 2 X￿Rn j ui(x) = ui
10for all i 2 N and x 2 XnEGg and replace the set clGrG in De￿nition 2 with clGrnG,
which will expand the scope of applications of Theorem 1.
The next lemma, along with Lemma 1, shows that the strong single deviation
property is another, slightly weakened, form of the better-reply security condition.
Lemma 2 If a compact game G = (Xi;ui)i2N is better-reply secure, then it has the
strong single deviation property.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B.
The closest to the strong single deviation property is the lower single deviation
property, introduced by Reny (2009). Its de￿nition is as follows. For each i 2 N, let




￿i). A game G = (Xi;ui)i2N
has the lower single-deviation property if whenever x 2 XnE(G), there exists d 2 X
and a neighborhood U of x such that for all x0 2 U, there is a player i for whom
ui(di;y￿i) > ui(x0) for all y 2 U.
Since "(x) in De￿nition 5 does not depend on x0 and ui(x0) ￿ ui(x0) for each
i 2 N and every x0 2 X, a game with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies that
has the strong single deviation property also has the lower single deviation property.
The latter property is a generalization of the better-reply security condition. In its
turn, the strong single deviation property may be considered as a slightly improved
version of the better-reply security condition. The lower single deviation property
can also be improved upon in a similar manner.
4 Equilibrium Existence in Qualitative Games
The proof of the main result of the section, Theorem 5, relies on a generalization of
the notion of an L-majorized correspondence (Yannelis and Prabhakar, 1983).
4.1 Domain L-Majorized Correspondences
Let X be a nonempty subset of a topological space, Y be nonempty, convex subset
of a vector space, and ￿ : X ! Y be a single-valued function. A correspondence
11F : X ￿ Y has open lower sections in X if F ￿1(y) = fx 2 X : y 2 F(x)g is open in
X for every y 2 Y ; F is of class L￿ with respect to ￿ if ￿(x) = 2 coF(x) for all x 2 X
and it has open lower sections in X. In the special cases when Y = X and ￿ is the
identity map on X and when X = ￿n
i=1Xi and ￿ : X ! Xi is the projection of X
onto Xi and Y = Xi, we will write L in place of L￿. The domain of F is de￿ned by
DomF = fx 2 X : F(x) 6= ?g. If DomF = X, then we say that F is strict.
Given F : X ￿ Y , ￿ : X ! Y; and x 2 X, a correspondence Fx : X ￿ Y is
an L￿-majorant of F at x if Fx is of class L￿ and there exists an open neighborhood
Ux of x in X such that F(z) ￿ Fx(z) for every z 2 Ux.3 The correspondence F is
locally L￿-majorized if, for each x 2 DomF, there exists an L￿-majorant of F at x;
and F is L￿-majorized if there exists a correspondence F : X ￿ Y of class L￿ such
that F(x) ￿ F(x) for every x 2 X.
The next maximal element existence result is equivalent to Browder￿ s ￿xed point
theorem (see Browder 1968, Theorem 1; Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Theorems 3.1
and 5.1).
Lemma 3 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological
vector space, and let F : X ￿ X be a correspondence of class L: Then there exists
b x 2 X such that F(b x) = ?:
The following lemma shows that, from the standpoint of applications, there are
no di⁄erences between L￿-majorized and locally L￿-majorized correspondences (see
Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Corollary 5.1; or Bagh 1998, Lemma 1.5).
Lemma 4 Let X be a nonempty, compact subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological vector
space, Y be a nonempty, convex subset of a vector space, and ￿ : X ! Y . Let
F : X ￿ Y be a strict correspondence. Then F is locally L￿-majorized if and only if
it is L￿-majorized.
Among the conditions of Lemma 4 is a nonstandard one, namely that F is a strict
correspondence. This condition is not restrictive since every proof using majorization
tools proceeds by contradiction.
3In this section, we will write Ux instead of UX(x) since there is no ambiguity regarding the
space in which the neighborhood is considered.
12The proof of Lemma 4 follows along the lines of the proof of Corollary 1 of Borglin
and Keiding (1976) (for details, see Ding et al. 1994, Theorem 1; Ding and Tan 1993,
Lemma 2, for the case when X is a paracompact topological space).
Corollary 2 (Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983, Corollary 5.1) follows from Lemmas 3
and 4 by way of contradiction.
Corollary 2 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological
vector space and F : X ￿ X be a locally L-majorized correspondence. Then there
exists b x 2 X such that F(b x) = ?.
Now, we introduce a generalization of the notion of an L-majorized correspon-
dence.
De￿nition 6 Let X be a nonempty subset of a topological space, Y be a nonempty,
convex subset of a vector space, and let ￿ : X ! Y . A correspondence F : X ￿ Y
is domain L￿-majorized if there exists a correspondence F : X ￿ Y of class L￿ such
that DomF ￿ DomF.
Clearly, if F is L￿-majorized, then it is domain L￿-majorized. Obviously, the
converse does not necessarily hold.
Theorem 4 is a maximal element existence theorem for domain L-majorized cor-
respondences.
Theorem 4 Let X be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological
vector space and F : X ￿ X be a domain L-majorized correspondence. Then there
exists b x 2 X such that F(b x) = ?:
Proof. Since F : X ￿ X is domain L-majorized, there is a correspondence F :
X ￿ X of class L such that DomF ￿ DomF. Then, by Lemma 3, F(b x) = ? for
some b x 2 X, which implies that F(b x) = ?.
The next lemma provides a set of su¢ cient conditions for a correspondence to be
domain L￿-majorized.
13Lemma 5 Let X be a compact Hausdor⁄ topological space and Y be a nonempty,
convex subset of a vector space. Let ￿ : X ! Y and F : X ￿ Y be a strict corre-
spondence such that
(i) for each x 2 X, there exist an open neighborhood Ux of x in X and a correspon-
dence Fx : X ￿ Y with DomFx = Ux and open lower sections in X;
(ii) for each A 2 hXi and every z 2 \x2AUx, ￿(z) = 2 cof[x2AFx(z)g.
Then F is domain L￿-majorized.
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix B, where is shown that assumptions
(i) and (ii) imply the existence of a strict correspondence F : X ￿ Y of class L￿.
It is worth noticing that another set of su¢ cient conditions obtains if assump-
tion (ii) is replaced with the more conventional assumption that \x2AUx ￿ Dom(\x2AFx)
for each A 2 hXi (see, e.g., Yuan 1999, Theorem 3.1). However, the latter assump-
tion has a strong ￿ avor of value majorization.
4.2 Qualitative Games
As before, let N = f1;:::;ng be a ￿nite set of players. Each player i￿ s strategy
set Xi is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological vector
space. Let X = ￿i2NXi and Pi : X ￿ Xi be player i￿ s preference correspondence.
Consider a qualitative game ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N. A strategy pro￿le x 2 X is an
equilibrium of ￿ if Pi(x) = ? for all i 2 N.
For a qualitative game ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N, we call the set Dom￿ = [i2NDomPi the
domain of ￿.
De￿nition 7 A game ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N is domain L-majorized if there exists a cor-
respondence F : X ￿ X of class L such that Dom￿ ￿ DomF.
Obviously, if ￿ is domain L-majorized, then it has an equilibrium b x 2 X; that
is, Pi(b x) = ? for each i 2 N. Therefore, if we want to show the existence of an
equilibrium in a qualitative game ￿, a legitimate way of doing that is to show that
the game is domain L-majorized. However, it is important to keep in mind that
14the correspondence F should not only have open lower sections but also satisfy the
condition that x = 2 coF(x) for all x 2 X.
Extending Lemma 5 to qualitative games produces an equilibrium existence result
which is analogous to Theorem 2.2 of Barelli and Soza (2009).
Corollary 3 Let Xi be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topo-
logical vector space and ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N be a qualitative game. Suppose, for each
x 2 Dom￿, there exist an (n + 1)-tuple (D1
x;:::;Dn
x;Ux), where Di
x : X ￿ Xi and
Ux is an open neighborhood of x in X, such that
(i) DomDi
x = Ux and Di
x has open lower sections in X for all i 2 N;
(ii) for each A 2 hDom￿i and every z 2 \x2AUx, there exists i 2 N such that
zi = 2 cof[x2ADi
x(z)g.
Then ￿ has an equilibrium.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that ￿ has no equilibrium. For each x 2 X,
consider Fx : X ￿ X de￿ned by Fx(z) = (D1
x(z);:::;Dn
x(z)). Since assumptions (i)
and (ii) of Lemma 5 are satis￿ed, ￿ is domain L-majorized, a contradiction.
From the standpoint of applications, assumption (i) of Corollary 3 is too strong.
Intuitively, if Pi(x) = ? for some i, then DomDi
x should be the empty set as well.
Moreover, assuming that (i) holds for all i 2 N makes it more di¢ cult, or even in
some cases impossible, to satisfy (ii).
Theorem 5 Let Xi be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological
vector space and ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N be a qualitative game. Suppose, for each x 2 Dom￿,
there exist I(x) ￿ N, and an (n + 1)-tuple (D1
x;:::;Dn
x;Ux), where Di
x : X ￿ Xi
and Ux is an open neighborhood of x in X, such that
(i) DomDi
x = Ux and Di
x has open lower sections in X for all i 2 I(x), and DomDi
x =
? for all i 2 NnfI(x)g;
(ii) for each A 2 hDom￿i and every z 2 \x2AUx, there exists i 2 [x2AI(x) such that
zi = 2 cof[x2ADi
x(z)g.
Then ￿ has an equilibrium.
15Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that ￿ has no equilibrium, i.e. Dom￿ = X. The
compactness of X implies that the open covering fUx : x 2 Xg of X contains a
￿nite subcover fUxj : j 2 Jg, where J is a ￿nite set. Let fVxj : j 2 Jg be an open
re￿nement of fUxj : j 2 Jg such that clVxj ￿ Uxj for every j 2 J (see Aliprantis and
Border 2006, pp. 169-171). For each j 2 J and each i 2 N, de￿ne a correspondence
F
j







xj(z) if z 2 clVxj and i 2 I(xj),
Xi if z = 2 clVxj or i = 2 I(xj).
It is not di¢ cult to see that each F
j
i has open lower sections. Then for each
i 2 N, the correspondence Fi : X ￿ Xi de￿ned by Fi(z) = \j2JF
j
i (z) has open
lower sections. Therefore, the correspondence F : X ￿ X de￿ned by F(z) =
\i2Nf￿k2NnfigXk ￿ Fi(z)g also has open lower sections.
Fix some z 2 X. It lies in some Vxj. We have to show that zi0 = 2 coF
j
i0(z) for
some i0 2 I(xj). Denote A = fs 2 J : z 2 Vxsg. Then assumption (ii) implies
that there exists i0 2 [x2AI(x) such that zi0 = 2 cof[j2ADi0




xj(z), we conclude that zi0 = 2 coF
j
i0(z). Therefore zi0 = 2 coFi0(z), and,
consequently, z = 2 coF(z).
Since F is of class L and Dom￿ = DomF = X, ￿ is domain L-majorized, a
contradiction.
Corollary 4 is a version of the Fan-Browder collective ￿xed point theorem. In
Lassonde and Schenkel (1992, Theorem 5), it follows from a generalization of the
KKM lemma, which is a re￿ ection of the fact that the KKM lemma and Browder￿ s
￿xed point theorem are two equivalent results (see Yannelis 1991, pp. 105-109, for
an in-depth explanation).4
Corollary 4 Let X1;:::;Xn be nonempty, compact, convex subsets of Hausdor⁄
topological vector spaces, and X = ￿i2NXi. For each i 2 N, let Di : X ￿ Xi have
4Prokopovych (2011) uses the Fan-Browder collective ￿xed point theorem in its classical form
to show Reny￿ s equilibrium existence theorem.
16open lower sections. If for each x 2 X, there exists i 2 N such that Di(x) 6= ?, then
there exists x 2 X and i 2 N such that x 2 coDi(x).
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that each correspondence Di is of class L. Con-
sider the game ￿ = (Xi;Di)i2N. For each x 2 X, put I(x) = fi 2 N : Di(x) 6= ?g
and ￿x a neighborhood Ux such that Ux ￿ DomDi for all i 2 I(x). Then de￿ne
Dx
i : X ￿ Xi as a restriction of Di to Ux for i 2 I(x) and put DomDx
i = ? for
i 2 NnI(x). By Theorem 5, ￿ has an equilibrium, a contradiction.
Corollary 5 is a strengthening of Corollary 5 for qualitative games.
Corollary 5 Let each Xi be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Hausdor⁄
topological vector space and let ￿ = (Xi;Pi)i2N be a qualitative game. Assume that,
for each i 2 N, the correspondence Pi : X ￿ Xi is domain L-majorized. Then ￿ has
an equilibrium in X.
Proof. Since the players￿preference correspondences are domain L-majorized, for
each i 2 N there exists Fi : X ￿ Xi of class L such that DomPi ￿ DomFi.
By Corollary 4, there exists x 2 X such that Fi(x) = ? for all i 2 N. Since
Dom￿ = [i2NDomPi ￿ [i2NDomFi, ￿ has an equilibrium.
Appendix A
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 3 and an intuitive explanation of the
amending technique used in the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume, by contradiction, that G has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Since
G has the weak single deviation property, for every x 2 X there exist an open ball
BX(x;3r(x)) of x in X, a set of players I(x) ￿ f1;2g, and a collection of deviation
strategies K(x) = fdi 2 Xi : i 2 I(x)g such that, for every x0 2 BX(x;3r(x)),
ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) for some i 2 I(x).
17We will amend the initial open cover of X, fBX(x;r(x)) : x 2 Xg, in a number
of steps. First, we additionally assume that, for every x 2 X, r(x); I(x), and K(x)
satisfy the following three conditions:
(a) if di 6= xi for some i 2 I(x), then jdi ￿ xij > 5r(x);
(b) I(x) is minimal in the following sense: If I = f1;2g, there are no r > 0 and
i 2 f1;2g such that ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) for all x0 2 BX(x;r);
(c) if di = xi for some i 2 I(x), then di can not be replaced in K(x) with di 2 Xinfdig
such that, for some r > 0 and every x0 in BX(x;3r), at least one of the following
inequalities holds: ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) or u￿i(d￿i;x0
i) > u￿i(x0).
As is shown below, if the elements of the cover satisfy these three simple condi-
tions, we do not have to further amend them in most cases. Condition (a) is not
restrictive since, for every x 2 X, the radius r(x) can be chosen arbitrarily small.
If I(x) = f1;2g, then condition (b) states that, given K(x), it is impossible to
reduce the number of elements of I(x) by choosing a smaller r(x). One can notice
that condition (c) is also not burdensome. If di = xi for some i 2 I(x) and there
are r > 0 and di 2 Xinfdig such that ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) for every x0 2 BX(x;3r) at
which ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) and u￿i(d￿i;x0
i) ￿ u￿i(x0), then we replace BX(x;r(x)) in
the cover with BX(x;r) and di in K(x) = fd1;d2g with di. A useful fact to keep in
mind is that if di = xi for some i 2 I(x), then d￿i does not coincide with x￿i.
The compactness of X implies that the open cover fBX(x;r(x)) : x 2 Xg of
X contains a ￿nite subcover fBX(xj;r(xj)) : j 2 Jg, where J = f1;:::;kg. It is
useful to notice that if BX(xs;r(xs)))\BX(xt;r(xt)) 6= ? and r(xs) > r(xt) for some
s;t 2 J, then BX(xt;r(xt)) ￿ BX(xs;3r(xs))). Hence for every x0 2 BX(xt;r(xt)),
there exist i 2 I(xs) and ds
i 2 K(xs) such that ui(ds
i;x0
￿i) > ui(x0).
Without loss of generality, we also assume that r(xs) > r(xt) if s;t 2 J and s < t,
and that each BX(xj;r(xj)) contains some points of X that do not lie in any of the
other elements of the subcover. The latter assumption will help us avoid dealing
with empty sets in the course of amending the cover.
Let us show that, for our purposes, it is enough to focus attention on the in-
tersections of just two elements of the cover. In the reasoning below, the fact
that the open sets are open balls is not essential. So, we want to show that if






i g for i = 1;2 (here we assume that d
lj




ig, i = 1;2, for some s;t 2 fl1;:::;lmg.
Without loss of generality, fl1;:::;lmg = f1;:::;mg, u1(d1
1;z0







1g for some s 2 f2;:::;mg and u1 is




2) > u2(z0). Then for some
t 2 f1;:::;mg such that z0
2 2 cofds
2;dt
2g, the inequality u1(dt
1;z0
2) > u1(z0) holds. It
follows from the quasiconcavity of u1 in x1 that dt
1 < z0




i = 1;2, as claimed.
Now consider the intersection of the ￿rst two elements of the cover. Let there
be a point z0 2 BX(x1;r(x1)) \ BX(x2;r(x2)) such that z0
i 2 cofd1
i;d2
ig, i = 1;2.
First, we will show that it might happen only in one case (Case 7), and then we will
describe how to amend the cover to preclude Case 7 for every pair of intersecting
elements of the cover.
As before, we assume that r(x1) > r(x2) and that u1(d1
1;z0





2) > u2(z0) with d2
2 > z0
2 (if it is not so, renumber the players and/or
redirect one or both axes). Then the inclusions z0
i 2 cofd1
i;d2






We claim that if z0
i 2 cofd1
i;d2
ig for i = 1;2, then the following six cases are






























ig; i = 1;2, then d2
1 = x2
1, and from Case 5 that, moreover, d1
2 = x1
2. The








It might happen that z0
i 2 cofd1
i;d2
ig, i = 1;2, in Case 7. As a result, we have to
amend the cover so that to ensure that every two of its elements do not satisfy the
19conditions of Case 7.






2. Denote BX(x1;r(x1)) by V 1
X(x1;r(x1))
and replace BX(x1;r(x1)) in the cover fBX(xj;r(xj)) : j 2 Jg with V 2
X(x1;r(x1)) =
BX(x1;r(x1))nclBX(x2;r(x2)). We have to add to the cover a ￿nite number of open
balls covering the compact set A = @BX(x2;r(x2))\clBX(x1;r(x1)). For every x 2 A
with x2 6= d1
2, pick an open ball BX(x;r(x)) such that jx2 ￿ d1
2j > 5r(x) and ￿nd
a minimal I(x) ￿ I(x1) (for BX(x;r(x))) with K(x) ￿ K(x1) such that for every






2, we deduce that (d2
1;d1
2) = 2 A. Then for every x 2 A
with x2 = d1
2, it is possible to choose an open ball BX(x;r(x)) such that jx1 ￿ d2
1j >
5r(x) and ￿nd a minimal I(x) ￿ I(x2) with K(x) ￿ K(x2) such that for every
x0 2 BX(x;3r(x)), there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0).
Since A is a compact set, it has a ￿nite subset fx1
A;:::;xT








if t;s 2 f1;:::;Tg and t < s. Let xk+t = xt
A for all t 2 f1;:::;Tg. Consider
the ￿nite cover of X consisting of V 2
X(x1;r(x1)), BX(x2;r(x2)), :::,BX(xk;r(xk)),
BX(xk+1;r(xk+1)); :::; BX(xk+T;r(xk+T)).
For the open set V 2
X(x1;r(x1)), we use the same sets I(x1) and K(x1) as for





i for all i 2 I(xk+t) and all t 2 f1;:::;Tg. Hence, if a ball
added to the cover, for example BX(xs;r(xs)), s 2 fk;:::;k+Tg, intersects another
element of the cover, denoted by V (xj), then, for every z0 2 BX(xs;r(xs))\V (xj), we
have that z0
i = 2 cofds
i;d
j
ig for i = 1;2. This is so because V (xj) is either a subset of or
equal to an open ball satisfying conditions (a)-(c), and ds
i 6= xs
i for all i 2 I(xs), which
precludes Case 7. It is worth mentioning that x1 need not belong to V 2
X(x1;r(x1)).
Then consider the sets V 2
X(x1;r(x1)) and BX(x3;r(x3)). If needed, we again
amend the cover of X with the help of the just described technique, denoting
V 2
X(x1;r(x1))nclBX(x3;r(x3)) by V 3
X(x1;r(x1)). Otherwise we put V 3
X(x1;r(x1)) =
V 2
X(x1;r(x1)). After considering all the pairs V
j￿1
X (x1;r(x1)) and BX(xj;r(xj)), j =
2;:::;k, we denote V (x1) = V k
X(x1;r(x1)) and proceed to considering BX(x2;r(x2))
and BX(x3;r(x3)), and so on. If needed, the amending technique is applied again.
20One can see that the last ball that might need amending is BX(xk￿1;r(xk￿1)). Hence,
V (xs) = BX(xs;r(xs)) for s ￿ k. So, after a ￿nite number of rounds of amend-
ment, we will get a ￿nite open cover of X, fV (xj) : j = 1;:::;Rg with I(xj) and
fd
j
i 2 Xi : i 2 I(xj)g, such that
(a) for every x0 2 V (xj), ui(d
j
i;x0
￿i) > ui(x0) for some i 2 I(xj);
(b) for every pair s;t 2 f1;:::;Rg, s 6= t, if z0 2 V (xs) \ V (xt), then z0
i = 2 cofds
i;dt
ig
for some i 2 f1;2g, where again we assume that d
j
i = f?g if i 2 f1;2gnI(xj).
Let x be some point of X. Since fV (x1);:::;V (xR)g is a cover of X, there exists
V (xj); j 2 f1;:::;Rg, such that x 2 V (xj). Put UX(x) = V (xj) and I(x) = I(xj).
For each i 2 I(x), set di(x) = d
j
i. Then the conditions of Theorem 2 are satis￿ed, a
contradiction.
Proofs for Cases 1-6
The following fact will be used frequently below: It follows from the quasiconcavity of






































1;z2) for all (d2
1;z2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)). Then the containment BX(x2;r(x2)) ￿
BX(x1;3r(x1)) and the quasiconcavity of u2 in x2 imply that it must be the case that
u1(d1
1;z2) > u1(d2
1;z2) for all (d2
1;z2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)), which contradicts condition (c).




















2). However, the inclusion (d1
1;z0
2) 2 BX(x1;r(x1)) implies that
















2) would be located closer to x2 than z0, which is impossible
since z0 2 BX(x2;r(x2)). Therefore, x2
1 > d1



























Case 3.2. Let d2
2 6= x2
















Now we claim that, in contradiction to condition (b), u2(z1;d2
2) > u2(z) for all
z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)) with z1 such that (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)).
Assume, by contradiction, that u2(z1;d2
2) ￿ u2(z) for some z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)) with
z2 > z0
2 and z1 such that (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)). Then u1(d2
1;z2) > u1(z). Since
(d1
1;z0
2) = 2 BX(x2;3r(x2)) and (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)), we have that d1
1 < z1 and,
therefore, u1(z) ￿ u1(d1
1;z2). Then u2(z1;d1
2) > u2(z) ￿ u2(z1;d2
2), a contradiction.







2) for all (z1;z0
2) 2




2) for some (z1;z0




2), and, hence, u1(d2
1;z0
2) > u1(z1;z0









2) for all (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)). We
have to consider the following two subcases: 1) d2
2 = x2
2 and 2) d2
2 6= x2
2.












Case 4.2. Let d2
2 6= x2
2. Then, in contradiction to the minimality property of I(x2),
u2(z1;d2
2) > u2(z) for all z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)) with z1 such that (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)).
Let us show this.
Assume, by contradiction, that u2(z1;d2
2) ￿ u2(z) for some z 2 BX(x2;r(x2))
with z2 > z0
2 and z1 such that (z1;z0
2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)). Then u1(d2
1;z2) > u1(z), and,
hence, u2(z1;d1
2) > u2(z) ￿ u2(z1;d2
2), a contradiction.











1;z2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)), we have that u1(d1
1;z2) > u1(d2
1;z2) for all (d2
1;z2) 2
22BX(x2;r(x2)). In order to obtain a contradiction with condition (c), it is enough to
show that u1(d1
1;z2) > u1(z) for all z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)).
Assume that u1(d1
1;z2) ￿ u1(z) for some z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)) with z1 < d2
1. Then
it must be the case that u2(z1;d1
2) > u2(z), and, therefore, u1(d2
1;z2) > u1(z) ￿
u1(d1
1;z2), a contradiction.











1;z2) 2 BX(x2;r(x2)), we have that u1(d1
1;z2) > u1(d2
1;z2) for all (d2
1;z2) 2
BX(x2;r(x2)) with z2 ￿ d1
2. Then one can show that u1(d1
1;z2) > u1(z) for all
z 2 BX(x2;r(x2)) with z2 ￿ d1
2, which contradicts condition (c).
The Amending Technique: Example 3 (continued)
Now, using Example 3, we explain the intuition behind the amending technique used
in the proof of Theorem 5.
Let UX(x1) = BX(x1;r(x1)) with x1 = (1
2; 1
2), r(x1) = 1
10, I(x1) = f1;2g; and
(d1
1;d1
2) = (0; 1
2), and UX(x2) = BX(x2;r(x2)) with x2 = (1
2; 5





2;1). It is not di¢ cult to see that conditions (a)-(c) of the






ig, i = 1;2, for every z0 2 UX(x1) \ UX(x2) \ C.
We replace BX(x1;r(x1)) with VX(x1;r(x1)) = BX(x1;r(x1))nclBX(x2;r(x2)) and
keep BX(x2;r(x2)) unchanged. Obviously, the open sets VX(x1;r(x1)) and BX(x2;r(x2))
do not intersect. However, in order to cover the compact set A = @BX(x2;r(x2)) \
clBX(x1;r(x1)), we have to add a ￿nite number of new elements to the initial cover.
For every x 2 A with x2 6= d1
2, we pick an open ball BX(x;r(x)) such that
jx2 ￿ d1
2j > 5r(x) and ￿nd a minimal I(x) ￿ I(x1) (for BX(x;r(x))) with K(x) ￿
K(x1) such that for every x0 2 BX(x;3r(x)), there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di;x0
￿i) >
ui(x0).
For every x 2 A with x2 = d1
2, we pick BX(x;r(x)) such that jx0
1 ￿ d2
1j > 5r(x) and
￿nd a minimal I(x) ￿ I(x2) with K(x) ￿ K(x2) such that for every x0 2 BX(x;3r(x))
there exists i 2 I(x) with ui(di;x0
￿i) > ui(x0).
23At ￿rst glance, it looks like not much has changed. However, it is not so. For
example, if for some x 2 A \ intC, there is z0 2 BX(x;r(x)) \ BX(x2;r(x2)) such
that z0
i 2 cofdi;d2
ig, i = 1;2, then, obviously, I(x) = f1;2g. Moreover, as we have
shown in the proof of Theorem 3, it is possible only if di = xi for some i 2 f1;2g
(Case 7). However, this is not the case by construction. Therefore, the minimal I(x)
is a one-element set.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2
Fix x 2 XnEG. Let A(x) be the set of ￿ 2 Rn such that (x;￿) 2 clGrG. For





ui is lower semicontinuous in x￿i. For each i 2 N and every x￿i 2 X￿i, de￿ne
￿i : X￿i ! R by ￿i(x￿i) = sup
yi2Xi
ui(yi;x￿i). It is clear that each ￿i, as the supremum
of a collection of lower semicontinuous functions, is lower semicontinuous (see also
Reny 1999, p. 1037).
Since G is better-reply secure, for each ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿N) 2 A(x) there is i(￿) 2 N
such that ￿i(￿)(x￿i(￿)) > ￿i(￿). Pick "￿ > 0 and r￿ > 0 such that ￿i(￿)(x￿i(￿)) > ￿0
i(￿)+
"￿ for all ￿0 2 BRn(￿;r￿). We can say that player i(￿) secures the neighborhood
BRn(￿;r￿) at x.
Since A(x) is compact, the cover fBRn(￿;r￿) : ￿ 2 A(x)g contains a ￿nite sub-
cover fBRn(￿j;r￿j) : j = 1;:::;kg. Let "(x) = 1
2 min
j2f1;:::;kg
"￿j. Denote by Ji(x) the
collection of all j 2 f1;:::;kg such that player i secures BRn(￿j;r￿j) at x. Let
I(x) = fi 2 N : Ji(x) 6= ?g and ￿i = maxj2Ji(￿j + r￿j). Then, by the de￿n-
ition of the least upper bound, for each i 2 I(x) there exists di 2 Xi such that
ui(di;x￿i) > ￿i + "(x). From the lower semicontinuity of ui in x￿i, we deduce that
ui(di;x0
￿i) > ￿i + "(x) for all x0
￿i in some open neighborhood UX￿i(x￿i) of x￿i.
We claim that there exists an open neighborhood UX(x) of x such that, for
every x0 2 UX(x), there is some i 2 I(x) with ui(di;z￿i) ￿ "(x) > ui(x0) for all
24z￿i 2 UX￿i(x￿i). If it is not so, then one can construct a net fx￿g converging
to x such that, for each ￿ and each i 2 I(x), ui(di;z
￿
￿i) ￿ "(x) ￿ ui(x￿) for some
z
￿
￿i 2 UX￿i(x￿i). Since the payo⁄functions are bounded, there is no loss of generality
in assuming that the net fu(x￿)g converges to some ￿ 2 A(x). Then, for some
j 2 f1;:::kg, there exists b ￿ such that u(x￿) 2 BRn(￿j;r￿j) for all ￿ ￿ b ￿. Therefore,
for some i 2 I(x), ui(di;x0
￿i) ￿ ui(di;x0
￿i) > ￿i + "(x) > ui(x￿) + "(x) for all
x0
￿i 2 UX￿i(x￿i) and all ￿ ￿ b ￿, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5
The compactness of X implies that the open cover fUx : x 2 Xg of X contains a
￿nite subcover fUxj : j 2 Jg, where J is a ￿nite set. Let fGxj : j 2 Jg be a closed
re￿nement of fUxj : j 2 Jg such that Gxj ￿ Uxj for each j 2 J. For each j 2 J,
de￿ne a correspondence Fj : X ￿ Y by
Fj(z) =
(
[fs2J:z2UxsgFxs(z), if z 2 Gxj,
Y , if z = 2 Gxj.
Assumption (ii) implies that ￿(z) = 2 coFj(z) for all z 2 Gxj. Each Fj has open
lower sections in X since, for each y 2 Y ,
F
￿1
j (y) = fz 2 Gxj : y 2 ([fs2J:z2UxsgFxs(z))g [ (XnGxj)
= (Gxj \ ([s2J(Uxs \ F
￿1
xs (y))) [ (XnGxj)
= [s2J(Uxs \ F
￿1
xs (y)) [ (XnGxj):
Therefore F : X ￿ Y de￿ned by F(z) = \j2JFj(z) also has open lower sections. By
construction, DomF = X and F is of class L￿.
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